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Forza Roma Sempre!

A Skeptic's Welcome to Ricky Massara

Ricky Massara is Roma's new sporting director, a man whose career is defined by two conflicting narratives. On one hand, he built an outstanding, young, championship-winning AC Milan. On the other, he failed completely at Rennes, making a bad situation drastically worse. Both are true.

Massara and Milan

In the Italian blogosphere, they love to highlight his case with Milan, and deservedly so. Massara joined Milan at a very uncomfortable time in July 2019, when the club had limited resources. Massara formed a tandem with Maldini, and together they rebuilt Milan. Maldini initiated the hiring of Pioli in the fall of 2019, while Massara successfully found players to strengthen the squad. The entire impressive list of players (image below) indeed arrived at the club as a result of Massara's work. This is an undeniable achievement for Frédéric that cannot be understated.

There were also downsides to Massara's work in Milan: the club was very poor at selling players while failing to retain its leaders. In four years with Massara, Milan sold players for €126 million, while spending €334 million on purchases. During Massara's tenure, Franck Kessie, Hakan Calhanoglu, Gianluigi Donnarumma, and Alessio Romagnoli all waved goodbye for the grand sum of zero euros. The first three players were not just ironclad starters, but the undisputed leaders of that Milan team, and Romagnoli was also a significant player. Nevertheless, they managed to replace these leaders to one degree or another.

Massara and Rennes

Ricky Massara's most recent job was at Rennes, and it was a complete failure. Rennes, a club with the 4th-6th highest payroll in France, had a disastrous 2023/24 season and brought in Massara to fix things. Massara was given carte blanche for the rebuild: it was during his tenure that the club parted ways with Doue and Gouiri. These and other sales allowed Rennes to spend €154 million in one season, shattering their previous record of €84 million.

A major overhaul was expected, one that unfolded in the "finest" traditions of Monchi. With the money provided, Ricky bought a whole slew of players, of whom only Rouault and Samba made an impact. The main problem: Massara bought older players to perform "here and now", and they failed en masse. Seko Fofana, Glen Kamara, and Kyogo Furuhashi were supposed to become the leaders of the new Rennes; they are all 29-30 years old, not players for the future. Fofana and Furuhashi received the first and third-highest salaries at the club and showed nothing for it. Rennes dropped to 12th place, their lowest finish since 2014. Massara was fired, and Rennes is now left to sort through the consequences.

Massara and Roma

And let's not forget that Massara has already worked at Roma. He first served as an associate of Walter Sabatini, then was the sporting director for six months in the period between Sabatini and Monchi. A year later, he returned to Roma at Monchi's behest and was considered his "right-hand man." Massara was part of Monchi's team during the catastrophic sell-off of 2018. After Monchi's dismissal, he again became the sporting director for a couple of months, where he was remembered only for the non-renewal of Daniele De Rossi's contract (at the initiative of Pallotta), which drew the wrath of the tifosi.

Conclusions

The results of Massara's work may vary, but his methods do not. Ricky Massara’s effectiveness is not defined by his own methods, but by his environment. He is a quintessential 'implementer' – a capable functionary who thrives when paired with a strong, ideological leader. Without that structure, you get the Rennes dumpster fire.

He is being brought to Roma to work under Gasperini. In this regard, I don't quite understand what was wrong with Ghisolfi (if it was about contract renewals and poor sales, then replacing him with Massara is, to say the least, ironic). Massara will formally be Gasperini's superior, but de facto, he will be his support staff. It appears Massara will handle the technical aspects of negotiations but will not influence the club's developmental course.

Whether this is good or bad is for you to decide. I believe we are copying the Atalanta model, but doing so in an incredibly clumsy way: there, the foundation with Gasperini was built not by a "follower" like Massara, but by a "leader" in Sartori, a decisive and authoritative figure. Sartori could challenge Gasperini; it is unlikely Massara will behave in the same way. He traditionally aligns himself with the leader, whether it be Maldini or Monchi - it doesn't matter much. Roma is consistently placing an almost fanatical faith in Gasperini, acting all gas, no brakes. The main thing is to hope there isn't a cliff on the path ahead.

The Roma Report

The Golden Handcuffs: The New 8-Year Contract Rule

The Italian Football Federation has changed the maximum length for player contracts from 5 years to 8 years. Now, we could potentially lock Svilar into a deal with Rome until 2033. This change will provide clubs with far greater security in retaining their players. The players themselves will have significantly less leverage to influence the future course of their careers. It’s one thing to state unequivocally that you want to leave with two years left on your contract; if the club doesn’t sell you now, they'll be forced to sell in a year just to get some value back. It's a completely different story when you have 5-6 years of contractual bondage ahead of you with no real mechanism to apply pressure. This initiative was pushed through by Aurelio De Laurentiis and Claudio Lotito (the presidents of Napoli and Lazio), so we can surmise which clubs will take full advantage of this option.

The most important point: this does NOT affect Financial Fair Play (FFP). Chelsea was the first to pioneer 8-year contracts to circumvent FFP rules. They simply amortized astronomical transfer fees over 8 years, which made the annual cost appear quite small and helped balance the books. In response, UEFA introduced a restriction: a transfer fee can only be amortized over a maximum of 5 years. So, while this new rule can’t be used to bypass FFP, it can certainly be used to guarantee the long-term stability of a squad.

All Renders, No Shovels: The Stadium Project Stalls Again

Roma has unveiled... no, not the stadium. Something better! Generated images of the stadium! To be clear, this is not the actual project design, but rather just some content for the fans who grew concerned after the departure of Chief Administrative Officer Vitali, who was overseeing the project. It's a pretty hollow gesture, to be honest. I can generate these images right here in 10 minutes. However, the intent is commendable: the Friedkins are at least publicly signaling that they have not abandoned the project.

But there are downsides: the Gazzetta dello Sport reports that the official presentation has been postponed to September or October. First, that is a significant delay. As a reminder, the city council has been waiting for the project since last year, and Roma had initially planned to present the final version by February. Then they announced it would be presented in April, but that was postponed due to the death of Pope Francis. Whatever the actual reason was behind that bizarre excuse, the result was a delay of half a year, not a week.

Second, Rome's mayoral elections are scheduled for the fall of 2026, and during the campaign, all of Mayor Gualtieri's opponents will hammer him over the stadium issue. If we experience even the slightest additional delay, no decision will be made right before an election. The stadium's fate would then be decided after the votes are cast, and we would have to re-analyze Italy's political landscape all over again. If Gualtieri loses, the chances of the stadium being approved become very slim. For now (!), we are still on schedule, assuming there are no further delays. Even so, it’s shaping up to be a nerve-wracking race against time.

One Out, One In: The Familiar Rhythm of Roma's Mercato

Angelino played 51 matches last season and never showed clear signs of flagging. It would be a strange decision to sell him. No matter how much I like Evan Ndicka, I wouldn't rule out his sale, especially since the 25 million offer for Angelino is no longer on the table, and Di Marzio says Evan is no longer untouchable and Roma is “listening to the offers”.

Regarding incoming transfers, it's simple: there won't be any before July 1st. We are in the same position as in 2023: we have to sell for €11 million before we can buy. Negotiations are underway for Jhon Lucumi, but Bologna holds a strong negotiating position; they have an option to extend his contract until 2027. Consequently, Bologna is demanding his full release clause of €28 million. The alternative is Nayef Aguerd, who is owned by West Ham but performed well in La Liga. Aguerd is an experienced player who showed great promise at his peak, but he couldn't handle the physicality of the Premier League. He was good in Spain. Another factor is his age: at 29, he's at an acceptable age for a defender, but it comes with its own set of risks.

I consider the rumors about top-tier attackers to be mostly media hype, with the possible exception of Matt O'Riley. I can genuinely see Roma making a play for him; Gasperini is a big admirer. However, Brighton is asking for €30 million, and in attack, O'Riley tends to drift to the right, which is hardly our weakest spot. But we shall see; Roma will definitely sign an attacker of some sort.